讲座题目五： Bargaining their way to success: Machiavellian CEOs, organizational costs, and firm performance
讲 座 人： Aaron Hill
Dr. Aaron Hill is the Assistant Professor of Management at the Warrington College of Business at the University of Florida. His research interests include executives and top management teams, strategic leadership, and corporate political activity. Dr. Hill’s research has been published in top-tier journals including Strategic Management Journal, Academy of Management Journal, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, and Journal of Management. He currently serves as an editorial board member for Academy of Management Journal, Journal of Management, and Strategic Organization. He received Academy of Management Journal Best Reviewer Award (2017) and Richard W. Poole Research Excellence Award from Oklahoma State University (2012-2017).
This study builds on insights from both upper echelons and economizing theories in strategic management to examine the effects of CEO Machiavellianism on firm performance. While Machiavellianism has been usually construed as a purely negative trait, we argue that the pragmatic focus on the outcomes of exchanges and psychological obsession with winning in transactions that Machiavellian CEOs bring to their organizations can have important effects on organizational costs and performance. In line with our arguments, we find that CEO Machiavellianism has negative effects on relevant organizational costs and positive effects on organizational performance. We find support for our ideas with a sample of S&P 500 CEOs, operationalizing CEO Machiavellianism with a videometric approach. Supplemental analyses suggest that Machiavellian CEOs may bargain their way to personal success too, captured via upward pay adjustments, pay above predicted levels, and larger “Golden Parachutes” in the event of termination.
讲座题目六： Getting by with a little help from my friends: does political affinity lead to lower M&A premiums?
讲 座 人： Alex Settles
Dr. Alex Settles is the Clinical Associate Professor of Management at the Warrington College of Business at the University of Florida. His research interests include international business and entrepreneurship. His research has been published in scholarly journals including Strategic Management Journal, International Journal for Human Resource Management, Academy of Entrepreneurship Journal, and International Studies of Management and Organization. He is the recipient of CIEBS Best Paper Award from the International Management Division of Academy of Management (2014) and Faculty of Professional Practice Research Excellence Award from Rutgers Business School (2016).
The rise of economic nationalism and media reports suggest that politics plays an important role in international business transactions. However, we still know very little about how bilateral political relations affect corporate decision-making. In this article, we analyze the influence of the quality of bilateral political relations on the bidding behavior of foreign acquirers in cross-border acquisitions. We argue that the host government is more likely to intervene against the foreign acquirer during deal negotiations if the quality of bilateral political relations is poor. In the context of economic nationalism, we investigate the relevance of political affinity between countries to the initial acquisition premium offered in cross-border acquisitions. Political affinity is defined as the similarity of national interests in global affairs. We argue that political affinity affects how foreign acquirers anticipate their bargaining position in their negotiations with domestic target firms. With decreasing political affinity, the host government becomes increasingly likely to intervene against foreign firms in an acquisition deal. Consequently, foreign acquirers need to provide a more lucrative initial offer to dissuade target firms from leveraging government intervention to oppose the acquisition. Our prediction is supported by strong evidence that political affinity, as revealed by UN general assembly voting patterns, leads to lower initial acquisition premiums. A lower political affinity between countries therefore decreases the bargaining power of the acquirer and pushes up the initial bid premium the acquirer has to offer to the local target. Our empirical results confirm our argument.
讲座题目七： Starting in pole position: Applicant initial preferences and ultimate job choices
讲 座 人：Brian Swider
Dr. Brian Swider is the Assistant Professor of Management at the Warrington College of Business at the University of Florida. His research interests include selection, withdrawal, recruitment, well-being, and meta-analysis. He has published his research in scholarly journals including Journal of Applied Psychology, Human Resource Management, Journal of Management, The Leadership Quarterly, Journal of Vocational Behavior, and Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology. He is the recipient of the Brady Family Award for Faculty Research Excellence from Georgia Institute of Technology (2017). He currently serves as an associate editor for Human Resource Management and an editorial board member for Journal of Applied Psychology, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, and Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology.
While much is known about the various factors that predict future applicant attitudes and decisions during the recruitment process, far less is known about how these attitudes develop over time. In a field sample (Study 1), applicant initial preferences among a set of four firms predicted the directionality of subsequent applicant organizational attraction towards the firms over the five month recruiting cycle. Further, these initial preferences significantly predicted job choice decisions even after accounting for changes in organizational attraction that occurred during the entire recruiting cycle. Findings in a laboratory sample (Study 2) were consistent with research on predecision information distortion (PID) as applicants’ increasingly consistent attitude updating process was shown to be driven, in part, by inaccurate information processing. Applicants were overly positive (negative) regarding information about their eventually chosen (rejected) alternative. Applicants arriving at job choice decisions using biased information processing have the potential to result in adverse consequences for both organizations and applicants themselves.
主 持 人：张宝山 教授